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Brazil’s massive opportunity to decarbonize the World
September 15th 2023 | Report
Brazil’s massive opportunity to decarbonize the World
13 de setembro de 2023 | Relatório
Brazil’s climate change role is a study of contrasts. On one hand, the country is the sixth-largest greenhouse gas emitter globally, with net emissions[1] in 2021 of 1.7 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide equivalents (GtCO2e), or 2.4 GtCO2e of gross emissions[2], equal to about 3% of global emissions. On the other hand, Brazil is likely the only continent-sized country able to become carbon negative, making it indispensable if the world is to achieve the 1.5-degree Celsius (C) pathway laid out in the Paris Agreement [3]
Land use change, forestry, and agriculture generate 75% of gross emissions. In contrast to other high-carbon countries where the energy, transportation, and industry sectors contribute the most to emissions, 75% of Brazil’s gross emissions come from land use, land use change, and forestry (LULUCF) as well as from agriculture. Illegal deforestation is the country’s main source of emissions (approximately 1 GtCO2e, or 40% of gross emissions) fueled by “land-grabbing” [4] mechanisms. Enteric fermentation (a by product of livestock digestion) is the second largest source of emissions (about 0.4 GtCO2e, or 14% of gross emissions), largely arising from beef and dairy cattle herds.
Meanwhile, industrial activities, transportation, and power generation combined represent roughly 20% of gross emissions. Industrial activities generate about 10% of gross emissions (0.2 GtCO2e), mainly from hard-to-abate industries such as cement, iron and steel, and oil and gas. The transportation sector represents about 8% of gross emissions (0.2 GtCO2e) mainly from road transport, while power generation represents about 2% of gross emissions, as Brazil has a clean power matrix with roughly 80% of its installed capacity involving renewable sources. Despite their relatively reduced emissions, these sectors saw the highest percentual increase in the period 2005-2021, with an average cumulative growth of 40%. In a “status quo” scenario where no improvement is achieved versus the current situation, net emissions will grow 24% through 2050, reaching 2.1 GtCO2e[5]. Beyond the status quo scenario, this study developed two potential decarbonization pathways for Brazil: “Net Zero 2050” and “Green Powerhouse.” The first scenario models what each sector of the Brazilian economy must do to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050 in the most efficient way from an economic standpoint. The second assumes an accelerated transition speed, achieving net zero as early as realistically possible.
A first step: Net Zero 2050. To reach net zero by 2050, Brazil must take ambitious actions across sectors to decarbonize its economy. First and foremost, it needs to reduce illegal deforestation and adopt sustainable cattle management practices. While these two actions would cover 80% of the required abatement and absorption practices, it is not enough: crucially, the country must reduce emissions in other sectors, too. Key initiatives include further increasing the share of renewables – worth about 60 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (MtCO2e[6]) abatement potential by 2050 – and implementing about 34 MtCO2e of carbon capture and storage (CCS). Other key initiatives include promoting the use of green hydrogen (about 27 MtCO2e abated) and increasing the share of sustainable transportation technologies such as electric vehicles (EVs) to reduce approximately 25 MtCO2e.
Reaching net zero by 2050 would be economically efficient: a carbon price of about 20 dollars per tonne of carbon dioxide ($/tCO2[7]) would be enough to finance almost all the required initiatives (Exhibit 1). This is a significantly lower enablement carbon price than seen in other regions. For example, a similar threshold in the USA and the UK would require $100+ carbon prices.
Exhibit 1
The transition to net zero by 2050 would require an average annual investment of roughly $80 billion[8], which would however be offset by the additional productivity generated, particularly in the agriculture sector. The transition to a net-zero economy, in this scenario, could contribute up to about $34 billion in GDP and create up to 3.8 million jobs[9].
The benefits of taking a step beyond: the Green Powerhouse scenario. In the Green Powerhouse scenario, all available actions are implemented to reach net zero as early as realistically possible and maximize absorption potential. This scenario highlights Brazil’s opportunity to become the only continent-sized country to achieve net zero status by 2030 and even reach net negative emissions (-1.7 GtCO2e by 2050, equivalent to about 50% of EU emissions today), with the ability to offer offsets to other countries. Key initiatives to reach these results include the restoration of 60 million hectares (Mha) of highly degraded pastureland, the accelerated adoption of EVs, and industry electrification.
Reaching the Green Powerhouse scenario by 2050 would require a carbon “enablement cost” of about USD 35/tCO2e and an average annual investment of about $165 billion through 2050, with cost offsets coming mainly from agricultural productivity. The transition is projected to contribute up to $100 billion to Brazil’s GDP[10] and create up to 6.4 million jobs[11], more than double versus the Net Zero scenario.
To capture this full opportunity, Brazil needs to engage in multiple complex transformations. Enabling the transition will require the creation of economic incentives and financing mechanisms, including the implementation of a compliance carbon market and associated carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM). These actions will enable the tracking and pricing of emissions, expedite the debate on Article 6 of the Paris Agreement and other bilateral agreements that enable adequate taxation mechanisms to both kick-start the market, and ensure the international competitiveness of green sectors. In addition, Brazil would need to develop and modernize regulations to incentivize, facilitate, and guide the transition. These would include the enactment of an effective Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) with clear metrics, targets per sector, and capture curves; strengthened emissions tracking methodologies; a modernization of current regulations (such as the effective use of the forest code, for example), and the enactment and application of modern land ownership legislation. Brazil needs to create technical and human resources capabilities for the transition by developing curricula, such as Ph.D. programs and research scholarships and grants (e.g., like Embrapa has done for agriculture). It also needs to reskill workers affected by the transition, including those in strategic, technical, and operational roles.
Exhibit 2
Brazil is the sixth highest CO2 emitting country globally, behind China, the United States, India, Indonesia, and Russia. Nearly 50% of Brazilian gross emissions are concentrated in LULUCF, which accounts for 1.2 GtCO2e (Exhibit 3). Deforestation of the Amazon biome is the main source of emissions (34% of gross emissions) and is largely driven by illegal land grabbing. It is estimated that 94% of deforestation in the Amazon is illegal[12]. Consequently, ending illegal deforestation in Brazil will be crucial to reaching net zero.
Exhibit 3
Agriculture is the second largest sector in terms of emissions, with 0.6 GtCO2e (25% of gross emissions). Livestock enteric fermentation, which produces volatile fatty acids and gases, such as methane, a potent greenhouse gas[13], represents the largest contributor to emissions of the sector, with 0.4 GtCO2e (15% of gross emissions), with cattle raised for human consumption being the single largest contributor.
Industrial sectors in Brazil contribute 0.24 MtCO2e in process emissions[14] (10% of gross emissions). Considering both process and energy emissions[15], the highest emitters are iron and steel production, oil and gas (0.05 GtCO2e each), and cement (0.4 GtCO2e).
The transportation sector is the fourth largest contributor to Brazilian emissions, with 0.19 MtCO2e (8% of gross emissions). Over 90% of transportation emissions are concentrated in road transport, driven by trucks (0.09 GtCO2e) and cars (0.06 GtCO2e). These emissions result primarily from the use of fossil fuels (99% of transportation emissions). Although ethanol comprises 45% of car-related fuel consumption in Brazil, its emissions are insignificant when compared with total emissions given its biogenic circularity[16].
Overall, emissions per capita in Brazil (6.9 tCO2e per person per year) are slightly below the global average (7.5 tCO2e) and European Union levels (7.0 tCO2e). However, if LULUCF emissions (which typically vary across time) are discounted (Exhibit 4), Brazilian emissions per capita become significantly lower than the European average (4.9 versus 7.0 tCO2e per person). In fact, variations in LULUCF emissions (and more specifically, deforestation rates) are key to understanding the Brazilian emissions profile over time. Looking at historical data, a dramatic drop in emissions can be observed between 2003 and 2009 (-10% p.a.), which is likely associated with effective policies to prevent illegal deforestation. Since then, emissions have continuously increased in line with the growth in deforestation.
Exhibit 4
Meanwhile, non-LULUCF emissions have continuously increased; in the period between 2005 and 2021, they went from 0.96 to 1.21 GtCO2e (a 26% increase). More specifically, agricultural emissions went from 0.53 to 0.61 GtCO2e (a 15% increase), industry emissions went from 0.19 to 0.23 GtCO2e (a 22% increase), transport emissions went from 0.13 to 0.19 GtCO2e (a 46% increase) and power emissions have gone from 0.02 to 0.06 GtCO2e (a 175% increase). This increase could be explained by the growth of the Brazilian economy, which experienced GDP growth from $0.9 trillion to $1.6 trillion in the same period. Therefore, emissions intensity (tCO2e/USD) has halved in the period from 2.8 to 1.5 (Exhibit 5).
Exhibit 5
An NDC is a climate action plan to decarbonize the economy and adapt to climate change. Each party to the Paris Agreement is required to establish an NDC and update it every five years[17]. Brazil’s NDC is committed to halving emissions by 2030 and reaching net zero by 2050. From a 2005 baseline, Brazil would need to reach 1.7 GtCO2e gross emissions by 2030 (a 37% reduction) and 1.4 GtCO2e gross emissions by 2050 (a 50% reduction).
In addition to the emission reduction targets, Brazil’s NDC also reinforces the government’s willingness to reach zero illegal deforestation by 2028. Beyond the NDC, other measures specified by Brazil’s Environmental Ministry include the restoration and reforestation of 18 Mha by 2030, reaching 50% of renewable energy participation in the total energy matrix by 2030, the recovery of 30 Mha of degraded pastures, and encouragement to expand the railway network.
Although Brazil has set short- and long-term decarbonization commitments, its NDC falls short when compared with those of most peer countries. Its second update, published in 2022, demonstrates minor improvements versus the 2016 version. Together with Russia and New Zealand, Brazil’s NDC is classified by the NGO World Wildlife Fund (WWF) for Nature as an “NDC We Don’t Want” (Exhibit 6). The WWF reviews NDCs against a checklist of 20 criteria, divided into 5 areas: (1) ambition, (2) fostering systemic change, (3) inclusiveness and participation, (4) contribution to sustainable development, and (5) tracking progress. Brazil received an “NDC We Don’t Want” assessment in every area. Among the main reasons for such an assessment there are the relapse in ambition and reduction targets (versus the 2016 version) and a lack of transparency regarding the adaptation plan[18].
Exhibit 6
To ensure Brazil’s NDC accountability and clarity, sector commitments should be clearly defined in the document. While sector initiatives are being launched, they only represent non-binding commitments. These include the Amazon plan (provisions against illegal deforestation, fires, and land crimes committed in the Legal Amazon), the Brazilian initiative for the voluntary carbon market (integrity mechanisms for voluntary carbon projects), the federal ABC plan (financial incentives for low carbon agriculture), and H4D (funding for hydrogen from public and private sources). They also include RenovaBio (public policy setting annual decarbonization targets for the fuel sector and encouraging increased biofuels production), and EnergIFE (development of renewable energy efficiency in universities), among others.
Brazil needs to take relevant action to achieve NDC commitments towards net zero by 2050. In a status quo projection, following macro indicators and a tech-frozen scenario, Brazil's emissions would increase 24% versus 2021, leading to 2.1 GtCO2e net emissions in 2050.
Two other scenarios have been developed: Net Zero, in which Brazil achieves net zero emission by pulling the most cost-efficient levers, and Green Powerhouse, in which Brazil would pull all available levers and maximize sequestration to support global decarbonization (Exhibit 7).
Exhibit 7
In the Net Zero 2050 scenario, measures are taken across different sectors to decarbonize the economy by 2050, prioritizing low- or no-cost actions such as reducing illegal deforestation and adopting sustainable cattle management (Exhibit 8).
Approximately 80% of the potential for reaching Net Zero by 2050 is concentrated in LULUCF (including absorptions) and agriculture. Land use change emissions represent 49% of the abatement potential, largely driven by the end of illegal deforestation, while absorptions through nature-based solutions (NBS) represent 20%, and emission reduction in agriculture is another 13% of abatement.
Exhibit 8
In the Green Powerhouse scenario, all available actions are pursued to reach net zero as soon as possible and to maximize carbon sequestration (Exhibit 9). This scenario highlights Brazil’s potential to become the only continent-size country to reach net zero by 2030 and even achieve net negative emissions (-1.7 GtCO2e by 2050), with the ability to offer carbon sequestration to other countries. This potential could be mainly captured by achieving zero illegal deforestation by 2030, broad implementation of regenerative agriculture – for example, 28.5 Mha of ICLF[19] – and full potential adoption (60 Mha) in restoration initiatives by 2050.
Exhibit 9
LULUCF is both Brazil’s primary source of gross emissions and its most promising way to decarbonize the country through nature-based solutions. The LULUCF sector encompasses all the activities and management practices that result in changes in carbon stocks in existing biomass and soils and the associated release and sequestration of CO2 to/from the atmosphere[20]. Brazilian GHG emissions are concentrated in LULUCF, with 1.2 GtCO2e in 2021, representing 49% of the country’s gross emissions that year. The main driver of emissions is illegal deforestation rates, especially in the Amazon biome.
Reaching the Green Powerhouse status requires a concerted effort. To reach net zero and go beyond it (reaching net emissions of -1.7 GtCO2e in 2050) LULUCF must contribute with 3.3 GtCO2e of reduction in 2050, through two main actions: deforestation avoidance (1.1 GtCO2e reduction), and reforestation of native forest and afforestation (2.1 GtCO2e absorptions).
Tackling the issues surrounding deforestation is a fundamental part of the solution. The rate at which Brazil will be able to control deforestation will dictate the pace at which the country will reach net zero. It can make use of REDD+[21] mechanisms to finance and avoid emissions at a cost of less than USD 7/tCO2e.
The LULUCF sector can also be a source of opportunities, when delivering NBS, such as the reforestation of native forests and afforestation. Besides a huge carbon abatement of up to 2.1 GtCO2e per year, NBS provides a series of positive externalities for society and the environment, including biodiversity protection, water security, job creation, and generation of economic value.
A rapidly developing concept, Regenerative Agriculture (RA) has a strategic role in decarbonizing land use. By combining best practices in crop management with sustainable livestock production, Regenerative Agriculture practices can have positive environmental, economic, and social impacts. Economic viability studies from EMBRAPA[22] show that, depending on the RA model, each USD invested can return USD 1,07-1,69 in revenue from productivity gains in crops, wood products, and livestock production.
It is relevant to consider that Brazil is home to the largest tropical rainforest in the world: the Amazon Forest covers 39% of the national territory[23]. Tropical forests are a natural carbon sink, storing an estimated 120 billion tonnes of carbon in the soil and biomass above the ground[24]. The historical development model in the Amazon[25] region has resulted in high deforestation rates.
First created in 1965, Brazil’s Forest Code provides a regulatory framework for protecting the native vegetation in permanent preservation areas, legal reserves, areas of restricted use, and forest exploitation areas, and addresses related issues. However, in 2021, 34% of deforestation continued to occur in protected areas in the Amazon (Exhibit 10).
Exhibit 10
Addressing land grabbers. The deforestation of the Amazon is largely driven by land grabbing, which is defined as “criminal practices of allotting, dismembering or making proposals on public lands, without authorization from the competent body and in disagreement with legislation[26].” Ownership is typically justified by putting down the forest for timber and converting the land to other economic uses, mainly for extensive cattle ranching.
Two relevant barriers prevent the halt of illegal deforestation. One, the lack of a comprehensive national database of property boundaries (i.e., a land registry) and modern land ownership legislation; and two, the declining size of deforestation patches, which makes them increasingly difficult to detect.
In its nationally determined commitment to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC), Brazil pledged to end illegal deforestation by 2028[27]. To achieve this target, it will be necessary to invest in land-ownership regularization, ecological economic zoning, improvement in control actions, development of payment mechanisms for environmental services (e.g., REDD+), and the bioeconomy[28].
In the Green Powerhouse scenario, Brazil can economically restore 60 Mha of degraded pastureland to forest across its five main biomes. This is no easy task. Although the restoration of natural biomes is a relatively known science, it has never been done before at this scale. Restoring 60 Mha will require the emergence of a new value chain encompassing seed picking/production, sapling nurseries, mechanized plantation, health monitoring, project financing, certification, and verification, among other elements to enable planting close to 1 million trees a day on average from 2024 to 2050.
While it may seem like a Herculean achievement, it is one Brazil has extensive experience in, from the enhancement of soy and corn productivity to the growth of biomass for the pulp and paper industry to the scaling of wind and solar energy generation over the last two decades.
Decarbonizing agriculture can be seen as a win-win opportunity. Despite being responsible for 25% of the country’s current gross emissions, the agriculture sector can significantly contribute to Brazil’s transition with potential to abate approximately 330 MtCO2e by 2050. By continuing to increase productivity, implementing sustainable practices and adopting less carbon intensive models of production, the sector can improve both carbon intensity and yields. This presents a unique opportunity for players to not only reduce emissions but also drive economic impact and social development.
Livestock production is responsible for the majority of agriculture emissions (75%), with enteric fermentation[29] as the main GHG source. It represents about 0.3 GtCO2e or an estimated 50% of agricultural and 15% of total country emissions. Considering Brazil’s cattle herd in 2021, this equals an emissions intensity of 1.5 tonnes of CO2e per head in methane alone. Other emissions come from soil management[30] and are related to land use practices, including animal manure deposited directly on pastures, agricultural waste decomposition, and the use of synthetic fertilizers.
The main decarbonization levers for livestock production involve upgrading cattle herd feeding practices (e.g., increase pasture quality and enhance land use) and improving the herd’s health management. For the mitigation of soil management emissions, the main decarbonization levers are related to optimizing limestone and fertilizers use. Exhibit 11 outlines the main decarbonization levers for agriculture.
Exhibit 11
Implementing sustainable agriculture practices will require additional investments for technology adoption and workforce reskilling. Considering the options available, agriculture is the sector with the highest capital expenditure needed for decarbonization, accounting for 63% of the USD 4.9 trillion needed by 2050 in the Green Powerhouse scenario.
Increasing yield productivity is the key to capturing greater benefits. As an upside of the investment needed to reduce emissions, adopting more productive livestock management models can significantly increase revenues, making feeding-related decarbonization levers value-generating mainly due to productivity gains in kilograms of body weight or liters of raw milk produced. For instance, in cattle grazing systems, recovering degraded pastures with high-quality forage could return USD 2.2 for each dollar invested, by increasing cattle density and intensifying production. Similar gains are found when investing in dairy cattle by reducing heat stress and increasing animal welfare, which can lead to an increase in milk production[31].
Enabling actions needed to accelerate the decarbonization of Brazilian agriculture. To capture the opportunity beyond productivity gains, other dimensions must be addressed, implemented, and scaled rapidly: extension services, carbon pricing, private-sector investments, financing, and premiums paid for agricultural products with lower carbon intensity. With these enablers in place, farmers and businesses will be attracted to invest in emissions reduction within their respective value chains (insetting[32]) and to create value at the same time. Close collaboration with partners across the value chain is a must to unlock these opportunities.
Industrial sectors – primarily the iron, steel, and cement sectors – are the third-largest emitter, representing about 10% of total Brazilian emissions. From a total of 0.23 GtCO2e emissions, iron and steel are responsible for about 40% of emissions, while cement contributes 22% of emissions. These are hard-to-abate industries that will mostly rely on three decarbonization solutions: the reduction of fossil fuel consumption by increasing low-emission alternatives such as green hydrogen and biomass; electrification; and the implementation of CCUS (Carbon Capture, Usage, and Storage) technology.
Each of the three solutions has implementation complexities worth considering. The use of green hydrogen requires the availability of renewable energy, transmission lines, and pipeline and storage infrastructure. Biomass use is restricted to locations where there is an equilibrium of at-scale availability and logistic considerations, such as the ability to use roads and railways at reasonable distances. Finally, CCUS technology is not yet mature, and will require significant investments. Its use is only available in specific areas – mostly close to oil wells on the Brazilian coast or in cluster locations (e.g., close to ethanol plants in the southeast).
Although there are currently no sector-specific announced targets, industry associations such as SNIC (National Union of the Cement Industry)and "Aço Brasil" (Brazil Steel Institute) ABHAV (Green Hydrogen and Ammonia Association), and IAB (Brazil Steel Institute) among others are publishing studies and organizing industry players to implement actions.
Currently, roughly 95% of Brazil’s iron and steel emissions come from basic oxygen furnace (BOF) plants, used in about 74% of steel production. Looking forward, most BOF plants in Brazil will reach their required refurbishment deadlines in the 2030s, which presents opportunities to either entirely convert them to the H2-DRI-EAF[33] route or implement CCS technologies. Additionally, other enhancements might reduce steel emissions such as the substitution of PCI with biocarbon for the iron reduction process and heat.
In the cement sector, approximately 86% of CO2 emissions primarily result from the calcination process, which in Brazil is mostly powered by petroleum coke (petcoke) and other low-cost fuels. CCUS is the main lever to decarbonize the cement industry, however, it is only applicable to about 40% of total production. Additionally, alternative fuels (e.g., biomass) will also play a key role in decarbonizing the remaining emissions.
The Net Zero 2050 scenario considers a total abatement potential of about 0.2 GtCO2e by implementing a mix of technologies across the main sectors. Of the total production in the cement sector, the scenario estimates that 60% would derive from a combination of biomass, CCS, or a combination of both. For the iron and steel sector, by 2050 it is expected to implement CCS in 30% of production and reach another 30% of production via the H2-DRI-EAF route.Moreover, there is an opportunity for Brazil to become a global player in the green metallics industry as the country’s production cost for decarbonized primary metallics (green pig iron and green HBI) is significantly more competitive than, for example, Europe, once CBAM is implemented (Exhibit 12). This would not impact the emissions profile of Brazil; however, it could accelerate the scaling of new technologies necessary for industry decarbonization.
Exhibit 12
For the Green Powerhouse scenario, there is an overall higher proportion of alternatives substituting for the incumbent production methods. The cement sector would need to increase its adoption of biomass and CCS. In the iron and steel sector, the majority of conventional BOF routes must be replaced by H2-DRI-EAF, and enhanced with CCS.
Transportation-related emissions have been increasing with the economy’s growth. Transportation is the fourth largest emitting sector, representing about 10% of total Brazilian GHG emissions. Road vehicles account for 92% of transportation emissions, of which trucks and cars are the most significant emitters, with a combined 73% contribution share.
Sector emissions result largely from the use of petroleum-derived fuels (such as diesel, gasoline, kerosene, and oil) for road vehicles, and decarbonization options rely on two main alternatives: reducing fossil fuel consumption by enhancing energy efficiency or shifting powertrain choices away from fossil fuels.
Brazil has no specific target for EV adoption, but global trends in long-term vehicle efficiency and tighter efficiency standards for internal combustion engine (ICE) are already in place. These include the Rota 2030 program, PROCONVE ("Programa de Controle da Poluição do Ar por Veículos Automotores", or "Program for the control of air pollution by motorized vehicles") Resolutions, and RenovaBio – a public policy of annual national decarbonization targets to encourage increased biofuel addition to diesel.
Trucks are responsible for 42% of transportation sector emissions, and the road cargo fleet in Brazil will continue to grow through the coming decades (Exhibit 13). In the net zero in 2050 scenario, decarbonization comes from an increase in EV and fuel cell electric vehicle (FCEV) truck penetration (reaching 15% by 2050), primarily in the private sector. It also results from an increase in the share of biodiesel in the mandatory blend for the country (recently defined as 12%, which may reach 15% by 2026[34]).
Exhibit 13
In the Green Powerhouse scenario, xEVs (e.g., Hybrid and Battery Electrical Vehicles) reach about 70% of new truck sales by 2050, resulting in 2.7 million trucks on Brazilian roads featuring xEV technologies (about 50% of the parc). This will likely reduce the oil-based ICE parc to 25% by 2050[35].
The second segment that emits the most GHGs is passenger cars. Although ethanol makes up 45% of car-related fuel consumption in Brazil[36], it represents insignificant emissions, given its biogenic circularity.
While BEV appears as the mid- to long-term dominant solution for transportation segments, the transition could be enabled by several technologies, at different paces, for example, ethanol and P/HEV[37] could serve as the relevant bridge technologies.
In the aviation sector, there are commitments from the Ministry of Infrastructure (2021) to reduce CO2 emissions by 17.2% through fuel consumption efficiency gains and the use of up to 50% of SAF[38] by 2050.
There are two broad types of renewable energy: renewable electricity (e.g., solar and wind power) and bioenergy (e.g., ethanol, advanced biofuels, and biomethane). What makes Brazil unique is its competitiveness in both areas – it can produce large amounts of energy at competitive costs.
Brazil already has a relatively clean energy matrix, with approximately 45% of its energy coming from renewable sources. Its electricity matrix is even cleaner, with more than 80% of its capacity being renewable (and more than 90% of actual power generation in good years for hydropower, such as 2022). Going forward, we can expect our energy and electricity matrices to become even cleaner: solar and wind are the cheapest sources to expand power generation in Brazil, and we expect the electrification of the economy to accelerate – directly and indirectly, using green hydrogen and its derivatives. We also expect bioenergy to grow even faster going forward.
To achieve the Net Zero 2050 scenario, the primary energy demand mix must change drastically. In 2021, Brazil had a total primary energy demand of 10k petajoule (PJ), segregated by use of bioliquids (e.g, biodiesel), biomass, biogas, coal, natural gas, oil, and renewables (e.g., wind, solar and hydropower).
In the Green Powerhouse scenario, Brazil could reach 11k PJ by 2030 and 12k PJ by 2050 in primary energy demand (Exhibit 14). This indicates an overall change in the energy matrix, shifting toward a cleaner supply since Brazil currently relies on oil and natural gas (for over 49% of primary energy demand) but will need to further switch to zero-emissions alternatives such as renewables, biogas, biomass, and biofuels to reach net zero by 2050.
Exhibit 14
As shown in Exhibit 14, zero-emissions alternatives will become a central part of the primary energy mix, accounting for 62% to 73% of the total primary energy demand, depending on the scenario. Absorptions from NBS will allow Brazil to maintain the remaining demand for fossil fuels, mostly from the industry and power sectors.
The energy demand by application will also change by 2050. As we can see in Exhibit 15, agriculture and buildings will expand total energy demand very slowly, while industry and transportation will grow fast.
Exhibit 15
Therefore, to contribute to a net zero scenario in Brazil, hard-to-abate industries like cement, iron and steel, oil and gas, chemicals and pulp and paper will play a big role by electrifying their operations as well as using biomass as an energy source.
Given Brazil’s lower “enablement” carbon cost compared with other geographies, the Green Powerhouse scenario has important implications for GDP and job growth due to the increase in capex investments and operating expenditure (opex) savings and/or extra productivity generated. The economic and social impact of the transition was estimated by comparing the difference between status quo investment, opex, and productivity to those of the scenarios analyzed.
The Green Powerhouse scenario would require USD 4.9 tn in cumulated investment from 2024-2050 (roughly USD 165 billion per year, on average), which would be mainly offset by opex and productivity gains of USD 3.2 tn. The cumulative curves can be found in Exhibit 16.
Exhibit 16
The highest emitting economic sector – agriculture, including cattle ranching – is the one that has the most to gain from decarbonization. Every USD invested in decarbonizing agriculture, in special cattle ranching, yields 0.9 USD in opex and productivity gains.
As a result of the investments required and productivity gains expected in the move toward a carbon-negative economy, significant growth in GDP and jobs would materialize. The expansion of jobs and GDP will likely remain concentrated until 2040 when most of the investments are expected. Job growth will probably slow down and there is a potential loss in some sectors of the economy in the final decade of the transition. This could be avoided if savings from greater efficiency were reinvested in the economy.
The expected GDP growth of the Green Powerhouse scenario can add up to USD 100 billion to the economy and create 6.4 million jobs (Exhibit 17). Compared with just pursuing a Net Zero 2050 scenario, the Green Powerhouse requires 1.9 times more investment, however, it delivers about 2.5 times the GDP growth, about 30% additional return for every dollar invested.
Exhibit 17
The path to Brazil’s transition to a carbon-negative economy is full of opportunities. However, there are important measures the country must take to maximize the scaling and impact of this transition. These measures can be grouped into three main areas.
One of the main sources of GHG emissions, the illegal deforestation of the Amazon, is driven by land-grabbing mechanisms, which typically occur due to the forgery of title deeds and documents attesting ownership, thus characterizing property fraud. Reinforcing current regulation and surveillance, with the effective use of the environmental legislation, should inhibit additional deforestation, as will the enactment and application of a modern land ownership legal framework.
Additionally, strengthening emissions measurement and tracking methodologies is crucial to reflect true Brazilian emissions and absorptions. For example, soil management practices from regenerative agriculture are not accounted for in the national inventory. That represented an unaccounted absorption of about 0.25 GtCO2e in 2021. Investing in the better measurement of GHG emissions and sequestration measurements adequately adjusted for the type of emissions in Brazil (LULUCF and agriculture, NOx, and methane) can significantly improve public policy making. It also enables adequate emission intensity comparisons among sectors in Brazil and among the same sectors worldwide.
The implementation of a compliance carbon market (e.g., as ETS - Emissions Trading Systems) coupled with CBAM could significantly accelerate the transition to a carbon-negative economy. Beyond the obvious additional cost of emissions, three fundamental benefits can be gained. First, it would enable the market to price carbon according to supply and demand, allocating capital to the most efficient decarbonization levers. Second, it would clarify the legal, accounting, and tax framework of allowances and compensation bringing fungibility and liquidity to the market. Third, it would provide emissions tracking throughout the value chain, providing a likely competitive advantage for exports as many of Brazil’s value chains carry lower emissions intensity than the world average.
To significantly increase investment flows to Brazilian NBS solutions, Brazil should establish a compliance market, accelerate the enactment of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement (and associated bilateral agreements), implement an independent governance body (to coordinate international trade of high-integrity carbon credits), and establish the associated integrity mechanisms.
Fostering the creation of financing mechanisms to support the transition, like what has been done for solar in wind over the last 15 years, can kick off the market and accelerate the scaling of green sectors not only for the decarbonization of the economy but also for exports.
Building adequate technical and human capabilities to drive the transition is the third measure. Decarbonization capabilities need to be added to traditional curricula of technicians, undergrads, and grad students. Research grants and applied research will be needed to accelerate adoption, create economies of scale and address market needs regarding better verification and certification processes.
Finally, the social impact of decarbonization pathways depends on reskilling workers affected by the transition, including the creation of programs to develop skills for strategic, technical, and operational roles. As in any technological transition, the green sectors will likely drive job creation, while high-emitting segments will likely see a reduction in employment needs.
Brazil can play a unique role in climate change because of its unique emissions profile and distinct opportunity to provide the world with the necessary carbon emissions reduction, low-carbon products, and carbon sequestration solutions necessary to achieve net zero in an economically efficient manner.
While the way to get there is reasonably clear, the required enablers can be challenging and have the most value when they work together. Once they are in place, however, Brazil’s structural advantages will allow the private sector to turn the decarbonization of sectors into an attractive business opportunity.
That will be no easy task. But the path is clear, and the prize is large – for workers, businesses, the Brazilian society at large, and the planet.
These enablers will require significant action from the public and private sectors in a coordinated effort. Although not trivial to implement, such actions will be crucial to ensure that Brazil fulfills its potential as a global decarbonization powerhouse.
Brazil can be the country of the future, and that future is green.
About the autors
Nelson Ferreira, Reinaldo Fiorini, Roberto Fantoni, and Wieland Gurlit are senior partners in São Paulo where Felipe Fava, João Guillaumon, and Mikael Djanian are partners, and Luiz Pellegrini is associate partner. Henrique Ceotto is a partner in Belo Horizonte; Daniele Nadalin and Tatiana Sasson are associate partners in Rio de Janeiro; Xavier Costantini is a senior partner in Montevideo.
The authors would also like to thank Daniel Cramer, Carolina Viegas, Frederic Blas, Avelina Ivaldi, Ilan Schleif, Erik IJzermans, Sophia Teixeira, Nathalia Geronazzo, Rebeca Orosco, Felipe Modesto and Fernando Mello, for their support.
Footnotes